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The  paper  considers  the repeated  prisoner's  dilemma  in a large-population  random-matching 
setting  where  players  are  unable  to recognize  their  opponents.  Despite  the  informational  restrictions 
cooperation  is still a sequential  equilibrium  supported  by "contagious"  punishments.  The equilib- 
rium  does  not require  excessive  patience,  and  contrary  to previous  thought,  need  not be extraordin- 
arily  fragile.  It is robust  to the introduction  of small  amounts  of noise  and remains  nearly  efficient. 
Extensions  are  discussed  to models  with  heterogeneous  rates  of time  preference  and  without  public 
randomizations. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the earliest  work on the Folk Theorem,  it has been well known that when two 
players  face each other in a repeated  prisoner's  dilemma  the "cooperative"  outcome  can 
be sustained  as an equilibrium  (Friedman  (1971), Aumann  and Shapley  (1976)). A variety 
of extensions  are possible. Given additional  assumptions,  the Folk Theorem  has been 
shown to apply to N-player  games,  finite-horizon  games  of incomplete  information,  and 
games with imperfect  observations  (Fudenberg  and Maskin (1986), Fudenberg,  Levine, 
and Maskin  (1993)). 
In models of social games in which a large population of players are randomly 
matched it is reasonable  to assume that players have limited information  about other 
players'  actions,  e.g. players  may observe  only the outcome  of matches  in which  they are 
personally  involved.  The results  cited above are then not applicable.  This paper follows 
those of Kandori  (1992), Harrington  (1991), and Okuno-Fujiwara  and Postlewaite  (1990) 
in investigating  the extent to which Folk Theorem-type  results  may be obtained  despite 
the special  information  structures  generated  by random  matching  games. In particular,  I 
consider  a random  matching  version  of the prisoner's  dilemma  under  the most extreme 
informational  restriction-that players  not only do not observe  the outcomes  of games  in 
which they are not involved,  but also are completely  anonymous  in that they can neither 
recognize  nor communicate  the identity  of any of their  past opponents.  The main  conclu- 
sion of this paper  is that cooperation  is possible  in equilibrium  and that this cooperation 
is somewhat robust. I hope that the argument  is interesting  to game theorists as an 
illustration  of the variety  of dynamics  which  may emerge  in equilibrium  as a response  to 
informational  limitations.  The existence  of a cooperative  equilibrium  also has practical 
implications  in relation  to several  areas  of recent  research. 
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With anonymous  random matching, it is impossible to  maintain cooperation  in a 
repeated game simply by punishing players who deviate. This paper builds on the observa- 
tion of Kandori (1992) and Harrington (1991) that cooperation may nonetheless be pos- 
sible if players use strategies with "contagious" punishments. In such strategies, when one 
player cheats in period  t, his period-t opponent  cheats from period  t + 1 on,  infecting 
another player who cheats from period t + 2 on, etc. For any fixed population size, Kandori 
provides an example of a game in which cooperative repeated-game equilibria exist, show- 
ing that we can define payoffs for the prisoner's dilemma which allow cooperation in a 
sequential equilibrium. However, when the population is large the argument applies only 
to games with extreme payoffs. 
In this paper, I build on Kandori's arguments to study two main problems. First, for 
general payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma, is cooperation possible in a sequential equilib- 
rium? I find that the answer is yes for sufficiently patient players. The argument demon- 
strates the versatility of contagious punishments which lead to a breakdown of cooperation 
after a single deviation. I assume at first that a publicly observable random variable is 
available. The public randomization allows the severity of the punishments to be easily 
adjusted so that the players fear a breakdown enough that they will not deviate first and 
destroy cooperation,  but do not fear the breakdown so much that they are unwilling to 
contribute  to  its  spread  once  it  has  begun.  At  several points  I  emphasize  that  this 
cooperation does not require unduly patient players. 
The second problem is a study of the stability and efficiency of the equilibrium in a 
world with noise. Kandori observed that in the equilibrium he constructs a single deviation 
causes a permanent end to cooperation  and comments that this fragility may make the 
equilibrium inappropriate as a model for trade. His observation reflects two quite distinct 
concerns. The first is a modeling issue I will refer to  as stability. If we intend for the 
equilibrium to  model  cooperation  in actual social  settings and believe that in  the real 
world punishments never last infinitely long we would like to construct an equilibrium 
with this property. Given public randomizations, this is not difficult. The second is a desire 
for a model which retains its efficiency in a world with noise. If we introduce noise by 
assuming that players either tremble and accidentally play the wrong strategy or misinter- 
pret  the  actions  of  others,  the  equilibrium Kandori  gives  will  be  inefficient. Because 
cooperation  eventually breaks down, the expected payoff to very patient players will be 
near the non-cooperative level. In the standard repeated prisoner's dilemma with noise, 
the results of  Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1993)  imply that this inefficiency can be 
avoided. In the random-matching model here I am able to show that for sufficiently small 
probabilities of mistakes being made there is a sequential equilibrium in which players 
need not change their strategies in response to the presence of mistakes, and in which the 
inefficiency is small. While this is clearly a limiting result, we can conclude that the cooper- 
ative equilibrium with anonymous matching need not be as fragile as has been portrayed. 
While public randomizations are appropriate for many social situations, it is in the 
spirit of  this paper to make do with as little information as possible. For this reason I 
also consider the problem of eliminating the reliance on public randomizations, finding 
that a cooperative equilibrium still exists. Interestingly, play in this equilibrium follows 
an unusual pattern with punishments scattered among intervening periods of cooperation. 
Payoffs in a model with noise are nearly efficient even though the equilibrium is no longer 
stable. 
The questions analyzed here may be of  interest in connection with several lines of 
research. First, in experimental economics  it is a well-recognized concern that subjects 
who are asked to play a game several times may treat the situation as a repeated game. ELLISON  COOPERATION  IN THE PRISONER'S  DILEMMA  569 
To avoid repeated-game  effects  it is common practice  to randomly  match the players  in 
an anonymous  setting so that pairs of players  do not meet repeatedly.  The results  here 
suggest,  however,  that given moderate  population  sizes random  matching  may not solve 
the problem. 
Second,  random-matching  models  have  proven  useful  in recent  studies  of the  economic 
institutions  of trade.  Greif  (1989)  discusses  the Maghribi  traders,  a group  of North  African 
Jews  who conducted  trade  in many  Mediterranean  countries  in the 1  1th  century.  Milgrom 
et al. (1990) discuss  trade  in cities  and fairs  in Medieval  Europe.  In each  case, the underly- 
ing model is one of a large number  of traders  who in each period are randomly  paired 
with a trading  partner.  Each  pair is presumed  to play a game like the prisoner's  dilemma 
with each party having both the opportunity  and a private  incentive  to cheat the other 
by under-reporting  sales on consignment,  reneging  on promises  to make  future  payments 
or deliveries,  supplying  goods of inferior  quality,  etc. 
In this literature,  institutions are seen as a way of  avoiding the inefficiency  of 
non-cooperative  equilibria. Specifically,  it is noted that the standard Folk Theorem 
equilibria  of repeated  games make informational  demands  which are unreasonable  in 
a large society. Greif (1989) argues that the closeness  of the Maghribi  community  did 
allow the necessary  information  exchange.  He cites evidence that many traders  main- 
tained ties to  traders in  other cities. Via this network of  relationships  they would 
quickly  learn  the identity  of any cheaters,  allowing  the offending  parties  to be punished. 
Milgrom  et al. (1990) argue that such closeness  no longer  existed  with the development 
of larger  towns and trade  fairs, and that this problem  was resolved  by the development 
of the Law Merchant,  a private legal code whereby  disputes could be tried before a 
judge who often lacked the power of  enforcement.  That I  find cooperation to  be 
possible in equilibrium  without any institutions implies that it  is  more difficult to 
justify any institution  as the least costly method of avoiding inefficiency.  Note that it 
is certainly  not claimed here that we would have expected  to see cooperation  without 
institutions, nor even that the equilibrium  described here was feasible in  Medieval 
trade fairs. I claim only that a consideration  of whether it was feasible is necessary, 
and should sharpen  our understanding  of the role of the observed  institutions. 
Finally, several  authors have explored  the possibility  that large population  models 
may be used to reduce  the multiplicity  of equilibria  in repeated  games.  Rosenthal  (1979) 
discusses  "rational  Markovian  hypotheses"  in which  all players  react  to steady-state  con- 
jectures  based only on their current  opponent's  play in the previous  period, not on any 
further  history.  In the case of the prisoner's  dilemma,  both players  cheating  in every  period 
is the only such equilibrium  (except in one special case). Green (1980) and Sabourian 
(1990) discuss  models with noisy observation  of an aggregate  statistic  and show that as 
the number  of players  grows  large  the equilibrium  set shrinks  to the static  Nash outcome. 
With  an information  structure  like that of this  paper,  Milgrom  et al. (1990) note that with 
infinite  population  and an extreme  matching  rule where no player  can affect his future 
opponents'  play in any way, cheating  is the only Nash equilibrium  outcome.  Our results 
suggest that large populations  may do little to reduce  the equilibrium  set unless special 
assumptions  are made. 
The paper  is organized  as follows. Section  2 describes  the model more precisely  and 
exhibits  a sequential  equilibrium  which  sustains  cooperation.  Section  3 discusses  the prob- 
lem of stability  and also shows that after introducing  noise into the model we can still 
construct  an equilibrium  whose payoff approaches  the efficient  level as the amount of 
noise tends to zero, even for very patient  players.  Section  4 discusses  the extension  of the 
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2. THE RANDOM-MATCHING  MODEL 
For the remainder  of this paper,  I analyze  the model described  below. The game has M 
players  indexed  by is { 1, 2, 3, ...  , M} where  M?  4 is an even  number.  In each  time  period 
t e {1,  2, 3, . . . }, the players  are randomly  matched  into pairs  with player  i facing  player 
oi(t). It is assumed  that the pairings  are independent  over time and uniform  so that 
Prob{o1(t) =jlh,l}  =  Vj] i 
M-1 
for all possible  histories  h,_l. At time t, each pair of players  plays the prisoner's  dilemma 
as shown below. The payoff g is taken to be positive with I non-negative  so that each 
player  has D as a dominant  strategy  in the stage game. All players  have discount  factor 
bec(0,  1) and their  payoffs  are the discounted  sum of the payoffs  in each stage game. At 
the end of period t, each player  observes  only the outcome  of the prisoner's  dilemma  he 
and his opponent  played.  He does not observe  the identity  o,(t) of his opponent  and does 
not observe  the outcome  of any of the games  played  by other pairs  of players. 
C  D 
c  191  -l,I+g 
D  1+g,-l  f  0,0 
In addition, I will assume in this section and in the one which follows that before 
players  choose their actions in period t, they observe  a public random  variable  q, which 
is drawn  independently  from a uniform  distribution  on [0, 1]. In some situations,  it seems 
reasonable  to assume  that such a randomization  is available.  For example,  all traders  at 
a market  may have access  to the same  newspaper  or hear  the same  government  announce- 
ments.  In any case, the use of public  randomizations  simplifies  the exposition  below.  I will 
later  discuss  how many  of the same  results  can be obtained  without  public  randomizations. 
The first thing to note about this model is that we can not implement  the types of 
strategies  usually  used to prove  the Folk Theorem.  For example,  when a player  is the first 
to deviate,  there  is no way of identifying  him, so it will be impossible  to punish  one player 
more  severely  and reward  others  for carrying  out the punishment.  Also, there  is no obvious 
way to convey any information  about the precise  time of the deviation  so that players 
could coordinate  on something  like T-period  punishments. 
Kandori  (1992) shows that contagious  punishments  can be used to sustain  collusion 
in some circumstances.  Specifically,  he shows that for any population size M, we can 
choose the payoff 1  so that cooperation  is a sequential  equilibrium  for sufficiently  patient 
players.  The choice of 1 is used to give players  an incentive  to carry  out the punishment 
which follows a deviation. Unfortunately,  the value of 1 Kandori uses grows without 
bound as M increases  and may be unreasonable  for moderate  values  of M. 
The main result  of this section  is that cooperation  is indeed  a sequential  equilibrium 
of the random-matching  game for any payoffs  g and 1. The equilibrium  is supported  by 
strategies  like Kandori's  which rely on contagious  punishments.  All subsequent  results 
will rely on similar  strategies.  The following  proposition  gives the basic result. 
Proposition  1.  Consider the  random-natching model  with public  randomizations 
described above where M> 4 players play  the prisioner's dilenmma  with g>0,  > 0.  Then, ELLISON  COOPERATION  IN THE PRISONER'S  DILEMMA  571 
13 < 1 such that V3  e [3, 1) there is a sequential equilibrium  s*(3)  of the repeated game in 
which all players play C in every period along the equilibrium  path. 
Before giving a formal proof, let me first discuss the strategies  s*(3)  which will 
support  the equilibrium.  The strategies  described  below employ a contagious  process  by 
which a deviation  in period t will usually  lead to two players  playing  D in period t+ 1, 
then four players playing D in period t+2,  etc. The result is a breakdown  of social 
cooperation  which punishes  all players  after one deviates.  Given a function q(6)  to be 
defined  below, the strategies  are as follows. 
In period 1, all players  begin  play according  to phase I. 
Phase I  .  Play C in period t. 
If (C, C) is the outcome  for matched  players  i and  j, both play according 
to phase I in period t + 1. 
If (C, D), (D, C), or (D, D) results  in the game between  players  i and  j, 
then  at time  t + 1 both play  according  to phase  II if q,+ ?  _ q(3 ) and  accord- 
ing to phase I if q,+I>q(6). 
Phase II.  Play D in period t. 
In period t + I play according  to phase I if q,+I  > q(6 ) and according  to 
phase II if q, +  Iq('). 
The public randomizations  are being used to adjust  the severity  of the punishment 
phase so that it lasts 1/(1 -  q(S))  periods on average.  The basic idea of the proof is 
this. In a sequential  equilibrium  the continuation  payoffs  of the players  must satisfy  two 
constraints  derived  from players  not having a profitable  single-period  deviation. First, 
players  must not want to deviate  and play D in phase  I. When  punishments  are of infinite 
duration  (i.e. for q(6) = 1), sufficiently  patient  players  will not want to cause  a breakdown 
of cooperation  in phase  I so this constraint  is satisfied.  Second,  we must recognize  that in 
phase  II players  might  deviate  and play C in hopes  of slowing  the spread  of the contagious 
punishment.  When  punishments  almost  never  continue  (i.e. for q(6)  0) there  is no poss- 
ible gain to deviating  in phase II so this constraint  will be satisfied. 
To prove the proposition,  I show that there  exists at least one value q(6) which is 
both large  enough  to prevent  deviations  in phase  I and small  enough  to prevent  deviations 
in phase  II. The intuitive  reason  why this  can be done is simple.  In either  phase  I or phase  II 
player  i gets the same  short-term  gain of g from  playing  D when  this opponent  cooperates. 
However,  starting  a punishment  by playing  D in phase  I causes  a greater  loss in continua- 
tion payoff than does spreading  a punishment  by playing  D in phase Il. Once play is in 
phase  II, cooperation  is breaking  down anyway  so one extra  deviation  has limited  impact. 
Choosing  an appropriate  punishment  severity,  the loss from starting  a punishment  deters 
playing  D in phase I, but the loss from spreading  a punishment  does not deter  playing  D 
in phase lI. 
To formalize  this argument  let k be the number  of players  who are playing  according 
to phase II at the start of period t. Let  f(k,  6, q) be player  i's (per period) continuation 
payoff from period t on when all players  are playing the strategies  above, and player i 
and k -  I others are playing according  to phase II. If player i deviates  and plays D in 
phase I in period t, he gains  g in period  t but will have a lower  continuation  payoff  from 572  REVIEW  OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
period t + 1 on. To show that no deviation  is profitable  in phase I we must show that 
(1 -3)g?3q(3)(I  -f(2,  3, q(3))).  (1) 
We can also derive  a similar  sufficient  condition  for there  to be no profitable  deviation 
in phase II. If player i deviates and plays C in phase II at time t we have one of two 
possibilities.  First, he could be matched  with someone else who is playing  according  to 
phase II. In this case, the result  in period t is (C, D) instead  of (D, D), and continuation 
payoffs are unaffected.  Clearly,  player i is not better  off because  1?0.  Second, player i 
might  be matched  with  someone  who is playing  according  to phase  I. The period  t outcome 
is then (C, C) instead  of (D, C) so player  i loses g in period t. In the continuation  game, 
however,  one fewer player will be playing according  to phase II. The deviation  is not 
profitable  if 
(1 -3)g>3q(3)Ej[f(j,  3, q(3))-f(]j  1, 3, q(3))] 
where  the expectation  reflects  player  i's beliefs  over the number  of players  who will play 
according  to phase II at time t+ 1. To show that this relation  holds for beliefs  of player 
i consistent  with sequential  equilibrium,  a sufficient  condition is to show that it holds 
pointwise, i.e. 
(1-35)g?3q(3)(f(j,3,q(3))-f(j+1,  3,q(3)))  Vj>3.  (2) 
(The beliefs  must assign  probability  zero to j_2  because  when player  i is in phase II, his 
opponent  when he first saw cheating  and that player's  period t opponent  will also play 
according  to phase II in period t  +1.)  When (1) and (2) hold, we have a sequential 
equilibrium.  In establishing  these relations,  both the result  and the intermediate  calcula- 
tions of the following  lemma  will prove useful. 
Lemma 1.  f(k,  3, q) is convex in k for k_  1, i.e. 
f(k,  3, q) -f(k+  1, 3, q)  :f(k+s,  3, q)-f(k+s+  1, 3, q) 
for all s_  1. 
The lemma  simply  states that the loss in continuation  payoff from having  one extra 
player  infected  declines  as the number  of infected  players  grows. This is to be expected 
as, when many players  are infected,  the one extra  player  not infected  in period t is likely 
to become  infected  in period t + 1 anyway  and thus never  have a chance to affect  player 
i's payoff.  The proof is straightforward  once I introduce  enough  notation. 
Proof of Lemma 1.  Note  that 
f(k,  3, q) = Eg(k,  3, q, o), 
where o is the random  variable  whose  realization  is a pairing  of all players  in each  period, 
and the function  g gives player  l's continuation  payoff  for a given  matching  when  he and 
players  2, ..  .,  k are playing  according  to phase II. For expositional  convenience  I define 
h(k, 3, q, c)  to be player  i's continuation  payoff  when  he and players  2,..  ,k  and player 
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I show that 
E,>,  [g(k,  6, q,  (i)  -  h(kg 6  , q,  i)  E. ,[g(k  + s, 6, q,  (i)  - h(k + s, 6, q,  (i)) 
by showing  that the inequality  holds for every  realization  of w). 
Define the set C(t, k, o) by 
C(O,k,  ))={k+1,k?2,  ...  ,M}, 
C(t+ 1, k, o))= {i c-  t, k, o9))  Ii(t, o)) c-  t, k, o))}* 
C(t, k, a)  will be the set of players  still playing according  to phase I in period t when 
qS_  q for all s ? t and players  1, 2,..  ,k  begin in phase II in period  0. 
Define the set D(t,  a))  by 
D(O,  ))=  {M} 
D(t+  1, a))=D(t,  a))  u  {iIoi(t, a))eD(t,  a))). 
D(t, a))  gives the set of all players  who will be playing  according  to Phase II in period t 
when q, < q for all s?  t and player  M begins  in phase II in period  0. 
Note  that the payoff to  player 1 in period t differs between the situations of 
g(k, 6, q, a))  and h(k, 6, q, a))  only if qs_q  for all s?  t and only if his opponent  oI(t, a)) 
plays C when players 1, 2, . . . , k start in phase II but plays D when players  1, 2, ...  k, 
and player  M start in phase II. Thus, 
g(k  3, q,  ))-h(k  3, q, ))=Zo(1  -6)q'3'(1  +g)I(o1(t,  ))eC(t, k,  ) nD(t,  o)).  (3) 
(The notation I(E) indicates  a function  equal to one or zero depending  on whether  the 
deterministic  condition  E is true or false.) The definition  of C clearly  implies  that 
C(t, k+s,  a)  c C(t, k, a) 
so 
C(t,k+s,  a))fnD(t,  ))cQC(t,k,  a))fnD(t,  a)) 
and the expansion  (3) gives the desired  result. 
We are now in a position to give 
Proof of Proposition  1.  Let s*(3)  be the strategy  profile  given above. It suffices  to 
demonstrate  the existence  of a a < 1 such  that  (1) and (2) hold  for all a E  [6, 1). To establish 
the relation  (1), we will simply  define  a  and q(3) on [6,1) so that (1) holds with equality. 
To see that this is possible,  note that for q(3) = 1, punishments  are infinite  so 
f(2,  6, 1)  = (1-3 )Z,_063a, 
where  a, is the  expected  payoff  in the t-th  period  after  phase  II play  begins.  With  probability 
1 all players  will eventually  be infected  and start  playing  D so a,-. 0. We then have 
3 
lim  (I -f(2,  6, 1)) = oo, 
3-i  1-3 
lim  (1 -f(2,  6, 1))=0. 
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By continuity  we can choose 6  e(0,  1) so that 
l  f^(2,  6  1))=g.  (4) 
Note that when (1) holds with equality,  a player  in phase I is exactly  indifferent  between 
playing C and D. The payoff to a player  who plays D in period 1 is f(l,  6, q(3)). Thus, 
(1) holds with equality  only if 
(f(l,  3, q(3))-f(2,  3, q()))=g.  (5) 
The converse  is also true.  When  (5) holds, a player  in phase  I is exactly  indifferent  between 
playing  D in period t (and following  the equilibrium  strategies  thereafter)  and playing  C 
in period t then deviating  and playing  D in period t+ 1. Applying  the same indifference 
again, he is also indifferent  between  deviating  in period t and playing  C in periods  t and 
t + 1 and then deviating  in period t + 2. Repeating  this process,  he is indifferent  between 
deviating  in period t and cooperating  in all future  periods.  This implies that (1) holds 
with equality. 
From expansion  (3) we have 
q  (f(k,  3, q)-f(k+  1, 6, q)) 
=E 0o(8q)'+ (1 +g) Prob{ol(t,o))e C(t, k, )  n D(t,o)})  (6) 
As the right-hand  side depends  only on the product  3q, we simply  define 
q(3) -6/. 
Then, for any 3e[3,  1) 3q(3)=S  and 
lq(8) (f(1,  6, q(3))-f(2,  3, q(3)))=g 
as desired. 
The result of  the lemma now immediately  implies (2)  and hence completes the 
proof.  11 
At this point, we may better understand  the role of the prisoner's  dilemma  in the 
argument  above. In the prisoner's  dilemma,  the maximum  one-period  gain from cheating 
is identical  to the short-term  loss a play incurs  by not playing  the static  Nash equilibrium 
when he successfully  slows a punishment.  The convexity  argument  above establishes  that 
the loss starting  a punishment  is greater  than the gain from slowing  a punishment,  and 
therefore  that the short-term  loss/gain from following  the equilibrium  strategies  in phase 
I/Il can be made to lie between  these future  effects.  In general  games, such an argument 
shows that the symmetric  strategy  profile  A is an equilibrium  if the payoff  u(A, A) domi- 
nates the payoff  u(s*, s*) of a Nash equilibrium  and s* is a best response  to A. (This, for 
example, gives a Folk Theorem for games with a dominant-strategy  equilibrium.)  In 
other  games  there  may be a much  more  profitable  deviation  from  cooperation,  and hence 
strategies  similar  to those described  above will sustain  a Nash equilibrium  only if there  is 
a sufficient  difference  between the loss from starting  a punishment  and the gain from ELLISON  COOPERATION  IN THE PRISONER'S  DILEMMA  575 
TABLE I 
Discount factor sufficient to maintain cooperation 
g=0-01  g=l  g=  10 
M=2  0-01  0-50  0-91 
M=4  0-03  0-68  0-95 
M= 10  0-08  0-79  0-97 
M=  100  0-35  0-89  0-985 
M=  1000  0-57  0-93  0-990 
slowing  a punishment.  To establish  a more  general  Folk Theorem,  we would  need  somehow 
to create  punishments  for which that difference  could be made arbitrarily  large. 
It should also be noted that the assumption  that the random  matching  is uniform 
has been made largely  for convenience.  With this assumption  the players  have symmetric 
continuation  payoffs  and the analysis  is simplified  by the fact that these  can be written  as 
a function  of the number  of players  in each phase.  The idea that the long-term  consequen- 
ces of a single deviation  are smaller  when some players  are already  in the punishment 
phase appears  to be much more general,  and might be applicable  to populations  with 
other matching  rules such as the local matching  rules discussed  in Ellison (1993). The 
argument  does rely, however,  on the matching  being sufficiently  symmetric  so that all 
players  have the appropriate  incentive  to avoid or to spread  punishments. 
In a full-information  model, the "grim"  strategies  immediately  punish  a player  who 
has cheated  once. In contrast,  the contagious  punishment  takes  time  to spread  throughout 
the population  so that a player  may be able to cheat several  opponents  before  he begins 
to suffer  from the punishment  phase he has brought  on. This observation  leads us to ask 
whether  the equilibrium  described  in Proposition  1 requires  undue patience  on the part 
of the players. 
Table  I gives  the minium  value  of 8 which  can sustain  cooperation  for several  popula- 
tion sizes M and for several  values of the gain g to deviation.  For comparison,  I have 
also listed  under  the heading  M= 2 the discount  factor  necessary  for the standard  "grim" 
equilibrium  in a two-player  game.  In a limiting  sense,  the behaviour  of our model  matches 
that of Green  and Sabourian.  For a fixed  discount  factor,  cooperation  will be impossible 
if the population  size is sufficiently  large. From the table, however,  we can see that for 
reasonable  population  sizes  patience  is simply  not a problem  for our equilbrium.  With the 
extreme  gain (g= 10), cooperation  is possible  in a population  of one thousand  players  if 
players  meet one opponent  per month and discount  the future  at a rate of 5%  per year. 
For the more standard  payoffs  with  g= 1, cooperation  is possible  in the same  population 
even if players  meet only one opponent  per year. Moreover,  a more detailed  look at the 
numbers  in the table suggests  that (as would be expected  given the exponential  growth  of 
contagious  punishments)  doubling  the frequency  with which  players  meet squares  the size 
of the population  for which a cooperative  equilibrium  exists. Although  I have not done 
the calculation,  this would imply that cooperation  is possible  in any population  of fewer 
than a trillion  players  (with g= 1) if each player  meets one opponent  per quarter. 
To better  appreciate  the power of the contagious  punishments  in large  populations, 
it is instructive  to compare  the discount  factors  of Table I to those necessary  for another 
large  population  equilibrium.  While  this paper  focusses  on completely  anonymous  match- 
ing, for some applications  it may be reasonable  to make  the less stringent  assumption  that 
identities  can be observed  but not communicated.  In such a model, we could sustain 
cooperation  via personal  retaliation  strategies  where  a deviation  by player  i in period t 576  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
causes his period t opponent oi(t) to play D whenever  they are matched  in the future. 
Note that this equilibrium  requires  frequent  individual  interactions,  and thus requires  far 
more patient  players  than does the equilibrium  with contagious  punishments.  If player  i 
cheats in period  t, he gains  g in period t and loses 1 in each future  period  in which  he is 
again matched  with oi(t). This gives a cooperative  equilibrium  only if 
Oat1  g(M-1) 
'=  M-1  l+g(M-1) 
For g = 1 and M=  1000,  for example,  this requires  a = 0 999, whereas  a = 0 93 is sufficient 
for the equilibrium  with contagious  punishments. 
3. STABILITY  AND  EFFICIENCY  WITH NOISE 
The cooperative  equilibrium  described  in Section  2 exhibits  the desirable  property  of 
global stability  described  by Kandori  (1992).  That  is, after  any  finite  history,  the continua- 
tion payoffs  of the players  eventually  return  to the cooperative  level (with probability  1). 
Obviously,  this is a result  of the introduction  of public  randomizations.  The stability  does 
suggest,  though, that robustness  in this sense is not a big problem  for this model. 
A more  interesting  question  is whether  we can still sustain  a nearly  efficient  outcome 
in a model with noise. Suppose  we really believed  that the model of Section 2 with its 
completely  rational  players  and perfect  observations  were  an accurate  depiction  of reality. 
Even  if players  follow the strategies  of an equilibrium  with  infinite  punishments,  in equilib- 
rium  the punishment  never  begins,  so we have no reason  to care about the behaviour  of 
the continuation  payoffs  after  a deviation.  On the other hand, suppose  that there  is noise 
in the model,  as players  either  act irrationally  some  fraction  of the time,  or try  to cooperate 
but make mistakes  and play the wrong strategy  or misinterpret  their  opponent's  action. 
Again, I would  argue  that whether  an equilibrium  is stable  is not the appropriate  question 
to ask. If we have a globally  stable  equilibrium  in which the continuation  payoffs  return 
to the cooperative  level  so slowly  so that  with  noise the equilibrium  has an expected  payoff 
near  zero, stability  is not comforting.  Suppose  we have two different  equilibria  which  have 
the same loss of efficiency  after any deviation.  Should  we care if one equilibrium  has all 
the inefficiency  right away and then returns  to cooperation  while the other spreads  out 
the same inefficiency  over an infinite  time period?  The answer,  I think, is that all that 
matters  is the  degree  of efficiency  the equilibrium  attains  in a model  with  the  noise  explicitly 
modelled. 
- In the two-player  repeated  prisoner's  dilemma  complete  efficiency  can be attained  in 
the limit 6-1  (Fudenberg,  Levine,  and Maskin  (1993)). I will now introduce  noise into 
the model of Section 2 by assuming  that all players are constrained  to play D with 
probability  at least E  > 0 at every  possible  history.  In the trade  example,  this could corre- 
spond  to players  trying  to supply  a high-quality  good but accidentally  supplying  one which 
proves  defective.  A similar  result  could be obtained  if we assumed  instead  that there  was 
only noise in observing  opponents'  actions. While the equilibrium  of Section 2 is not 
robust  to this noise (because  of the exact  indifference  during  phase  I play), the proposition 
below  shows  that for a slightly  longer  punishment  length  we do in fact have  an equilibrium 
robust to this noise. While the existence  of a fully efficient  equilibrium  is still an open 
question,  the equilibrium  described  is approximately  efficient  in the sense  that  it approaches 
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Proposition 2.  Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, there exists  3' < 1 and a set 
of strategy profiles s*(3)  for  6e [6', 1) of  the random-matching  game with the following 
three properties: 
1. In the game with discount  factor 3, s*(3)  is a sequential equilibrium  with all players 
playing C on the path in every period. 
2.  Define s*(6,  ?)  to be the strategy which at each history assigns probability ?  to D 
and probability 1  -6  to the action given by s*(3).  Then, there exists  ? >0  such that 
V  <  ?  s*(3,  6)  is a sequential equilibrium  of a perturbed  game where all players are 
required to play D with probability at least 6 at each history. 
3.  For ui defined to player i's expected per period payoff, 
lim  lim ui(s*(3,  ?))=  1. 
--O  3-  I 
Outline  of Proof.  We will show that s*(3)  can be taken to have the same form as 
the strategy  profile  in the proof of Proposition  1, but with a slightly  larger  probability 
q'(3)  of continuing  in a punishment  phase.  The proof requires  attention  to some tedious 
details,  so I only outline the proof here and leave the rest to the Appendix. 
To begin,  I give a slight  extension  of Lemma  1, showing  that the continuation  payoff 
function  f is strictly  convex.  The strict  convexity  allows  us to choose a slightly  larger  q'(6) 
so that the two inequalities  which describe  a player's  loss from deviating  in phase I or 
phase II of the model with no noise hold strictly.  Formally,  the Appendix  shows that we 
can choose  8', q'(6)  and q > 0 for which 3 ? 3'  implies 
bq'(6  ) (f(O,  6, q'(8 )) -f  (2, 6, q'(8))  > g + q  (7) 
and 
Xq'( ) (f(k,  6, q'(3))  -f(k+  1, 3, q'(3)))  <g-iI  Vk>2.  (8) 
This immediately  gives property  1. 
To show that these strategies  give an equilibrium  for all sufficiently  small 6 requires 
two further  steps. First, it must be shown that the left-hand  side of each equation is 
uniformly  continuous  in 6 so that for small  enough  6 the inequalities  above still hold but 
with q replaced  by ii/2.  For f(k, 3, q, 6)  defined  to be the continuation  payoff of the 
strategies  s*(6, 6)  the Appendix  demonstrates  the existence  of an ?  <0 such that for any 
6<  ? 
8q(6 
(f(  l, 6 , q'( 6 ) ,  ?c)-f  (2, 6  , q ( 5 ) , E)) > g + q /2  (  9) 
and 
3q'()  (f(k,  3, q'(8),  ?)-f(k+  1, 6, q'(6),  6))<g-  i/2  Vk?2.  (10) 
Second,  we have a new complication  in that when a player  is playing  according  to phase 
1, he can no longer believe  with probability  1 that all other players  are doing so. Again 
though,  as ?-+0,  this uncertainty  also has an effect  which  vanishes  so that the incentives 
to cooperate  are maintained  for sufficiently  small  6.  This completes  the proof of 2. 578  REVIEW  OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
Finally, the proof that we get efficiency  in the limit  is easy. The basic  idea is that the 
punishment  phases  have  a finite  expected  length  bounded  above  by a constant  independent 
of a  for a  close to 1. As ? - 0 a vanishing  fraction  of the periods  is spent  in a punishment 
phase, so the expected payoff tends to the efficient  level. Again the details are in the 
Appendix.  11 
The results  of Proposition  2 indicate  that the equilibrium  I have described  is far less 
fragile than it might appear at first. The same strategies  yield an equilibrium  for all 
sufficiently  small  amounts  of noise, so players  can cooperate  even if they do not know the 
precise  frequency  with which  other  players  make  mistakes.  Further,  the strategies  are truly 
supporting  cooperation  in the sense of having  nearly  efficient  payoffs  with noise. 
The theoretical  notion of stability  established  in Proposition  2 has practical  signifi- 
cance, for example,  in that it implies  that a formal  justification  of institutions  cannot rely 
on the simplest  limiting  notion of robustness.  I should  note, however,  that in other  ways 
contagious  equilibria  may be very non-robust.  For example,  if we wish to assess  whether 
a cooperative  equilibrium  was possible in a particular  population  of traders,  we would 
want to consider  reasonable  mistake  probabilities.  Population  size then becomes  a major 
concern,  because  the ? defined  in Proposition  2 may be extremely  small  and is decreasing 
in M. If even one player  is expected  to tremble  in each period then mistakes  will be far 
too common for players  to want to cooperate  in order to avoid starting  a punishment. 
While  robustness  to large  trembles  is undoubtedly  a problem,  it is interesting  to note that 
there are ways to modify the model to accommodate  more frequent  mistakes.  First, we 
might  suppose  as in Ellison  (1993) that we have some type of local matching  rule  in which 
each player is likely to meet only say 50 opponents regardless  of the population size. 
Because  a player  suffers  soon after starting  a punishment  in his neighbourhood  and cares 
mostly about whether  a punishment  phase is ongoing nearby, it might be possible to 
construct  an equilibrium  in which  5 and ? can be chosen  independently  of the population 
size and ?  is not so extremely  small. Second, even with uniform matching  we might 
(following  Milgrom  et al. (1990)) modify  the stage  game  so that a player  who accidentally 
trembles  has the opportunity  to give back his excess  payoff  at a trial and avoid the start 
of a punishment.  If mistakes  result  from independent  trembles  at each information  set, 
accidental  punishments  would now be much less likely.  While  a bit far-fetched,  this does 
provide  an alternative  justification  for legal institutions. 
What is probably  more important  practically  and harder  to overcome  is that the 
argument  above deals only with trembles.  If one player  were "crazy"  and always  played 
D (or simply was unaware  which equilibrium  was being played) again the contagious 
strategies  would not support  cooperation.  In large populations,  the assumption  that all 
players  are rational  and know their  opponents'  strategies  may be both very important  to 
the conclusions  and fairly  implausible. 
Returning  to our standard  model, the fact that each action in our equilibrium  with 
contagious punishments  is a strict best response  also allows the further  extension that 
follows. In a large  population,  we may want  to allow  for heterogeneity  among  the players. 
In particular,  it is probably  reasonable  to assume  that the players  have different  rates of 
time  preference.  In each  of the first  two propositions,  the equilibrium  strategy  profile  s*(6) 
is a function  of the discount  factor. For each discount  factor 3, the equilibrium  involves 
a different  probabilty  q(6) of continuing  within  the punishment  phase. Hence,  the strate- 
gies are  only appropriate  for a population  of players  all of whom  share  a common  discount 
factor.  As long as all of the players  are sufficiently  patient,  however,  we can eliminate  this 
restriction.  The proposition  below guarantees  the existence  of a sequential  equilibrium ELLISON  COOPERATION  IN THE PRISONER'S  DILEMMA  579 
strategy  profile  s* which  is not a function  of S. This profile  will then sustain  cooperation 
regardless  of whether  the population  shares  a common  discount  factor. For convenience, 
I shall discuss  only a model without noise although  the arguments  clearly  extend to the 
results  of Proposition  2 as well. The proof is similar  to that of Proposition  2, but is less 
involved. 
Proposition 3.  Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, there exists a strategy profile 
s* and a constant J" < 1 such that VS  e[6",  1), s* is a sequential equilibrium  of the repeated 
matching game and all players play  C in every period on the path of s*. 
Proof.  Once  again, let s* be a strategy  profile  like the one described  in the proof of 
Proposition  1, but this time  with punishment  probability  q"-=im3,1 q'(S).  (The function 
q'(S)  is defined  in the proof of Proposition  2. Note that q"  a constant  independent  of S 
and that q"  = 8', with 8' the value chosen in that proof.)  Intuitively, s* is an equilibrium 
for S close to one because  when S approaches  one, q"  approaches  q'(S)  and the strategy 
profile  s* approaches  the equilibrium  s*(8)  of Proposition  2. A formal  proof along these 
lines is rather  tedious  and involves  several  limiting  arguments  like those given  in the proof 
of Proposition  2. Instead,  a simple  constructive  proof is given below. 
Let  5"  = S/q",  where S  is  as  defined in  (4).  From (6)  we  know that  (Sql 
1  -  S)(f(l,  S, q) -f(2,  S, q)) depends  only on the product  Sq and is increasing  in that 
expression.  From 5? 5 " we have Sq"  5  and hence 
q (f(l,  S, q")-f(2,  , q"))?>  (f(I,  5, 1)-f(2,  6, 1)) 
=g, 
with the final equality  following  from (4). As in the proof of Proposition  1, this implies 
that no player  expects  to gain from a single-period  deviation  in phase 1. 
For any SE[3", 1), we also have Sq"  <q  = a'.  Hence, from (6), (8) and q  I(?) =1 we 
know that 
Sq" (f(2,  6, q") -f(3,  5, q")) < 1-3'  (f(2,  bt"  1) -f(3,  6  1) 
<g. 
This  equation,  combined  with the convexity  off in its first  argument  implies  that no player 
expects  to gain from a single-period  deviation  from phase  II play.  11 
A potentially  disturbing  aspect of the preceding  proof is that because it involves 
another  limit as  -+  1, the equilibrium  with heterogeneous  discount  factors  might require 
far more patient players than was previously  necessary.  From Table I we know that 
Propositions  1 and 2 do not require  unreasonably  patient  players.  Certainly,  the equilib- 
rium  described  in Proposition  3 will sometimes  require  more patient  players.  This is par- 
ticularly  true when the gain g from deviation  is small so that it is hard  to get players  to 
carry  out punishments.  For example,  for a population  of 100 players,  if we take g to be 
0-01 the equilibrium  as constructed  requires  S = 0-96. Usually,  though,  we will think  of g 
as being much larger. In the trade example,  the payoff of  1 is the profit or consumer 
surplus  from an honest transaction  and g represent  the additional  profit  from cheating 
(e.g. non-payment),  which  is liable  to be at least as large  as the profits  from honest  trade. 
For larger  values of g, a cooperative  equilibrium  with heterogeneity  often requires  no 580  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
greater  patience  than  was  necessary  for  cooperation  in the  homogeneous  population  model. 
When  the constraint  that players  be willing  to carry  out punishment  is sufficiently  far from 
binding,  we can simply  use infinite  punishments  for all Se [6, 1) to get an equilibrium. 
Numerical  calculations  show this to be the case for each of the population  sizes given in 
Table Iforg=I  org=10. 
4.  COOPERATION  WITHOUT PUBLIC RANDOMIZATIONS 
Throughout  this paper,  I have assumed  that a public  randomizing  device  is available.  For 
many applications,  including  trade  at a market,  the assumption  seems  reasonable.  When- 
ever all the players  are present  at the same physical  location it seems likely that if the 
players  looked hard enough they could find some random  factor like the weather  which 
everyone  could observe  and hence  use to coordinate.  Nonetheless,  the focus of this paper 
is to describe  how cooperation  can be maintained  with very little information  available 
to  the players. In this spirit then, I  will discuss what can be done without public 
randomizations. 
In Fudenberg  and  Maskin's  (1986)  proof  of the  perfect  Folk  Theorem,  public  random- 
izations play a crucial role in allowing the adjustment  of players  continuation  payoffs 
necessary  for maintaining  exact indifference.  Fudenberg  and Maskin (1991) show that 
public randomizations,  are, in fact, not necessary  for this purpose.  The crucial  insight  is 
that payoffs  in the convex hull of the set of feasible  payoffs  can be obtained  instead  from 
a deterministic  sequence  of play. 
In this paper,  randomizations  are  playing  two quite  distinct  roles.  First,  they  are used 
as a coordinating  device so that all players  can simultaneously  return  to cooperation  at 
the end of a punishment  phase. The simultaneity  is important  because  all players  only 
slightly  prefer  cooperating  when all others  are doing so. If the probability  that everyone 
else returns  to cooperation  in period t is not very close to one, no one will be willing  to 
try returning  to cooperative  play. Coordination  then allows the construction  of a globally 
stable  equilibrium.  Whether  global stability  is possible  without  the public  randomizations 
is unknown. 
The second role of the public  randomizations  in this paper  is to adjust  the expected 
duration,  and hence the severity  of the punishment.  This is the property  which enabled 
us to construct  strategies  where punishments  deter cheating,  but are not so severe that 
individuals  would be unwilling  to carry  them  out. In the argument  below, I show that for 
large  enough discount  factors  it is possible  to adjust  the severity  of the punishments  in a 
completely  different  way-spreading out the punishments  over time. This will allow us to 
establish  the most important  results  of the paper  even without the availability  of public 
randomizations. 
The ability  to soften punishments  by delaying  them is at the heart of the following 
lemma. The lemma guarantees  that any game which has a cooperative  equilibrium  for 
some interval  of discount factors has a cooperative  equilibrium  for all discount factors 
near  one as well. I hope that the very  simple  proof makes  the lemma  interesting  in its own 
right. 
Lemma 2.  Let G(S ) be any repeated game of complete information,  and suppose that 
there is a non-empty interval (S0,  S1)  such that G(S)  has a sequential equilibrium  s*(8) 
with outcome afor  all  SE(S0, S1). Then, there exists 3 < 1 such that V8e (,  I) we can also 
define a strategy profile s**(3)  which is a sequential equilibrium  of G(8)  with outcome a. ELLISON  COOPERATION  IN THE PRISONER'S  DILEMMA  581 
Proof.  The key observations  here is that for S close enough to 1, we can simulate 
the situation  of smaller  discount  factors  by using slower  responses. 
Take S = So/SI. For any Se(4,  1) there  exists an integer  N(S)  for which 
SN(s)E(0,  S1). 
When  there  is more  than one such integer  take N(S)  to be as large  as possible.  Now, have 
the players  treat the game G(S) as if it were N(S)  separate  games,  the first  taking  place 
in periods 
1, N(S)+  1, 2N(S)+  1, 3N(S)+  1  .  ... 
the second in periods 
2, N(S)+2,  2N(S)+2,  3N(S)+2,..., 
etc. Just as is the case in finding  Markov  equilibria,  if for some set T all other players 
play strategies  in period  t which  do not depend  on the outcomes  in all periods  t'  e T, then 
the best  response  for player  i can be taken  to be independent  of the outcomes  in all periods 
t'E  T as well. Hence, to show that we have an equilibrium  s**(S)  for G(S  ) it suffices  to 
show: 
1. The strategies  s**(S)  give play in period  aN+ b which does not depend  on play 
in period cN+ d if (b -  d)  is not a multiple of N. 
2. Restricting  consideration  to each "component"  game  played  in periods 
b, N(S)+b,  2N(S;)+b,  3N(S)+b,  ..., 
the restriction  of the strategy  profile  s**(S)  is a sequential  equilibrium. 
The obvious  choice of s**(S)  is to play the equilibrium  S*(SN  (s)) in each of the N(S) 
component  games  described  above. In our prisoner's  dilemma  example,  this would mean 
that if player  i or his opponent  plays D in period  aN(S ) + b, player  i plays D in periods 
(a + 1)N(S ) + b, (a+ 2)N(S ) +b,  . . . 
but does not change  his planned  play in any other  period.  Within  these  component  games, 
players  have discount  factor  5N(S),  So  S*(SN(s))  satisfies  the second  condition.  Clearly,  we 
have a sequential  equilibrium.  11 
Note that when q'(S) =1,  the strategies  described  in the proof of Proposition  2 
prescribe  infinite  punishments,  and hence  do not require  randomizations.  In particular,  8' 
was defined  so that taking  q  = 1 gives a sequential  equilibrium.  In order  to apply Lemma 
2, we need only show that infinite  punishments  also yield a sequential  equilibrium  for a 
small interval  of discount  factors  around  5'. This result  is not hard. It is simply  another 
application  of the fact that each action is a strict  best response.  The resulting  equilibrium 
of the game  has a peculiar  appearance  with punishments  being  softened  by being  delayed 
into the future,  spread  among intervening  periods  of cooperation.  In the trade  example, 
this might mean that if a single deviation  occurs  on a Friday,  eventually  we will see all 
players  cheating  on every  third  Friday  but cooperating  on all other  days.  The punishments 
are  of infinite  duration  so with noise,  eventually  all players  will  cheat  in all periods.  Despite 
this, the punishments  are  still  no more  severe  than  the punishments  of the  previous  section. 
As players  become  more  patient,  the punishment  periods  become  correspondingly  further 
apart.  The somewhat  surprising  result  is that in the limit  as the amount  of noise vanishes, 
the equilibrium  approaches  efficiency.  These results  are summarized  below. 582  REVIEW  OF ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
Proposition 4.  The results of Proposition 2 still hold in a model where  no public random- 
izations are available. 
Proof. In order to establish  the first two results of Proposition  2, that there is a 
sequential  equilibrium  which remains  an equilibrium  for sufficiently  small amounts ? of 
noise,  it will suffice  to show  that  for a fixed  range  of discount  factors  the standard  strategies 
with q = 1 give a sequential  equilibrium.  Just as in Proposition  3, we apply continuity  of 
the payoff  functions  to show that a strict  equilibrium  for one discount  factor  implies  that 
nearby  discount  factors  also gives an equilibrium. 
Recall that in the proof of Proposition  2, 6' was defined so that the contagious 
strategies  with parameter  q'(6')  = 1 give a sequential  equilibrium.  An important  intermedi- 
ate step in the proof was to establish  the existence  of ti  such that (9) and (10) held for 
all ?<  ?1 and all 8e[  ', 1). Substituting  8' into these equations  gives 
5  f,l,  6,9  , ?)-f(2,  6,  1, ?)) >g+  i/2 
and 
l-  (f(k,',  1, ?) -f(k+  I, 3', ?))<g-  /2  Vk>2. 
Restricting  attention  to values S  c[6', (1 + 3')/2], we once again can easily establish 
bounds on the derivatives  of the left-hand sides of the equations (11) and (12). For 
example,  using expression  (A3) from the proof of Proposition  2 we get 
;(_(f(k,g  81,  ) -f(k  +1,,  1,  I))) 
=E,=0  (t+ 1)6'(1 +g) Prob {oi(t)e C(t, k) n D(t) n E(t)} 




<4(1  +g) 
(1  0  3  )2' 
Hence,  we can find a value 3, such that for all Se[6', S8] and all ?_  ?,  we have 
l  f(I  _;  (t  I,  l, c)-f(29  oS,  l,  9  )) > g + ,/4  (13) 
and 
l  ,  (f(kg  ,  Is 1, c)-f(k  + 1, 6,  1,  9))  < g -  i/4  Vk  > 2.  (14) 
From here, the same steps as in the proof of Proposition  2 but with ii/2  in place of 'i 
show that for sufficiently  small ?,  the strategies  with q=  I give an equilibrium  for all 
8e[6',  3,].  Now, the construction  in Lemma  2 gives us an equilibrium  without public 
randomizations  for all 8e[6'/31,  1). 
A further  consequence  of Lemma  2 is that the per period payoff to a player with 
discount factor S of the no randomization  equilibrium  s**(8,  ?)  is exactly equal to the ELLISON  COOPERATION  IN THE PRISONER'S  DILEMMA  583 
TABLE  II 
Discount  factors with  and without  public  randomizations 
g=00  g=l  g=10 
a  0003  068  095 
M=4  51  003  100  100 
61E,  0-96  0-68  0-95 
3  0008  079  097 
M= 10  3,  0-08  1 00  1-00 
6/1,  0-96  0-79  0-97 
3  035  0-89  0-985 
M= 100  3,  0-36  1-00  1-00 
6181  0 96  0-89  0-985 
3  0-57  0-93  0990 
M= 1000  31  0-60  1-00  1-00 
3/3,  0-96  0-93  0-990 
per  period  payoff  that  the  strategies  with  q =1  give  a  player  with  discount  factor 
3N()f(0o  3N(3),  1, ?).  The function f is continuous in its second argument and 3N(6)  --*3 
as 3 --1,  so for ui being player i's expected utility in the game with discount factor 3, 
lim lim u1(s**(3,  e))=limf(0,  6', 1, ?). 
E-  O  t-+  cIEO 
This, however, is merely the limit of  the expected payoff for a fixed  discount factor as 
? - 0  so efficiency in the limit is easy.  For any  y >0,  we can simply choose  T so  that 
( I-S')(  1 + S' +  S"+  T)>  1-  y/2  then pick e small enough so that with very high prob- 
ability there are no  e-probability events in the first T periods, hence giving an expected 
payoff of at least 1  -  y in the game with ?  noise.  11 
If we had not worried about noise in this section, we could have found an equilibrium 
without public randomizations whenever 3e[d,  31] where S is defined by 
3(1 -f(2,  3,  1)) = (1 -  8)g 
and 31 is defined either by 
31(f(3,  3,,  1) -f(4  3,,  01))  = (1  -  3)g 
or by 31 =1  if the equation above has no  solution. Table II gives S, 31 and 3/3,  for a 
range of values of g  and M.  For 3 > 8  a cooperative sequential equilibrium exists with 
public randomizations, and for 3 > 3/3k  one exists without them. Note  that for many of 
the parameter values, 31 is in fact equal to one. In this case, eliminating public randomiza- 
tions does not require any additional patience on the part of the players. When g = 0 01, 
the difficulty in getting the players to carry out punishments results in much more patient 
play being necessary to support the equilibrium I have given. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
In all of  the results above, cooperation  has been sustained in equilibrium by the use of 
"contagious" punishments which lead eventually to a breakdown of cooperation after a 
single deviation. The results illustrate the extent to which the convexity of the breakdown 
process can be exploited, and the interesting patterns of play which can arise in equilibrium. 
In  addition,  the  contagious  punishments  are  a  fairly  powerful  tool  for  enforcing 584  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
cooperation.  Besides  the basic  result  that  cooperation  can be sustained  despite  a very  large 
population  of not unreasonably  patient players  with infrequent  individual  interactions, 
we have seen that cooperation  is still possible  with heterogeneity  in time preferences  or 
without  public  randomizations. 
I have also argued  that these results  can be made far more robust than Kandori's 
first example suggests. Global stability is not a problem if public randomizations  are 
available.  In a limiting  sense,  the  possibility  that  players  may  tremble  and  cheat  accidentally 
is also not a problem  even if players  do not know the exact frequency  of these trembles. 
All the attention  paid to robustness  in this sense  should  not be taken  to necessarily  imply 
that the paper is intended  to be a plausible  explanation  for why cooperation  has been 
observed  in some particular  situation.  The equilibrum  has a number  of problems  as a 
practical  model: the cooperative  equilibrium  is at best one of a multiplicity  of equilibria 
and when mistakes  are introduced  we may need extremely  restrictive  assumptions  on the 
frequency  of mistakes  and the size of the population.  The equilibrium  is also very  depen- 
dent  on the assumption  that  all players  are  rational.  I nonetheless  think  that  the robustness 
is not merely  of game  theoretic  interest,  because  it suggests  that  further  analysis  of proper- 
ties other than the simplest  notions of stability  or limiting  efficiency  with noise is needed 
and may improve  our understanding  of behaviour  in large  populations. 
Finally, I should note that I have also left one major question of game-theoretic 
interest  unanswered.  The results  of this paper  rely heavily  on the fact that the prisoner's 
dilemma  has a dominant  strategy  equilibrium.  In light of Kandori's  Folk Theorem  for 
games  with  a more  complex  information  structure,  it would  be interesting  to know  whether 
the results  of this paper  extend  to a more general  class of games.  If so, we would have a 
much  more general  Folk Theorem.  If not, we would  have a sharper  picture  of the type of 
information  transmission  which is necessary  to maintain  cooperation. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 2.  1 begin  by establishing  equations  (7) and (8) which  are analagous  to equations  (1) 
and (2) from  the proof  of Proposition  1. I will  writef(k, 3, q, ?) for the per  period  continuation  payoff  of player 
i when at the start of period  t, k players  (including  player  i if k > 0) are playing  according  to phase II of the 
strategies  described  in the proof of Proposition  1. I wish to show that there  exists 6' < 1, q > 0 and a:  function 
q': [3', 1) -.  [0, 11 such that (7) and (8) hold for all 8E[6',  1). 
Note first  that  because  I have  not yet introduced  noise,f(O,  3, q'(3),  0) = 1. I begin  by establishing  a degree 
of strict  convexity  of f  From  equation  (3) in the proof of Lemma  I we know that 
((f(l,  3, q, 0)-f(2,  6, q, 0)) -  (f(2,  3,  q, 0) -f(3,  3,  q, 0))) 
=EJE[_  0(1-3)q'8'(1  +g)I(ol(t,co)c-(C(t,l1,  @)-C(t,  2, a))r)  D(t,o@)))]. 
The second term of this sum is 
(I -  3)q6(l  +g)  Prob  {ol(t,  co)e(C(,  1, o) -  C(l,  2, ai))  r) D(I, w)}.  (Al) 
If player  2 is matched  with player  M in period  0 under  o we have 
2eC(Q, 1, o)  MeC(Q,  1, o) 
20 Q1,  2, ()  Mo QI,  2, () 
D(l,  o)={2,M}. 
Together,  these  imply 
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From  this,  we know  that  the probability  term  in (Al) is at least  the probability  that  players  2 and  M are  matched 
in period  0 and that player I subsequently  is matched  against  one of 2 or M in period 1. This probability  is 
2/(M-  1)2. 
Hence,  for 8 as defined  in Proposition  1, we have for any 3 > 8, 
X  - ((f(l3,  1, 0) -f(2,  3, 1, 0))-(  f(2,  3, 1,  0) -f(3,  3, 1, 0)))  (2M-1)2)-g  (A2) 
From  equation  (5) we know that 
l-6  (f(l,  6, 1, 0) -f(2,  8, 1,  O))-g. 
From  expansion  (6) in the proof of Proposition  I it is immediate  that 
-9  (fil,3,  1,0) -f(2,  3, 1,  0))I->0.  @3 
Thus for some q < y/2 we can choose 6'e(6,  1) so that 
45 
-f,f(l,  4', 1, 0) -f(2,  4', 1, 0)) = g+  1. 
By (A2) we know 
X5  -a(f(2,  4', 1, 0) -f(3,  3', 1, 0)) <g -q.  .1 
Now, we simply  set 
q'(3  6')  3 
and note from (6) that V3e-[', 1) 
q  )(f(k,  3, q(3),  0)-f(k  1, 3, q'(3),  0))=  g  (f(k,  ',  1, 0) -f(k+  1, 3', 1,0)). 
As q'(  ) > q(3 ), players  will not deviate  in phase  I of a model  with no noise so 
f(O, 8, q(  ), 0) >fil,  8, q'(8),  ). 
This establishes  (7) and (8) as desired. 
The next major  step in the proof  is to establish  that the similar  inequalities  (9) and (10) hold for a model 
with sufficiently  little  noise. To do this, I extend  expansion  (3) to a model  with noise.  Note that 
f(k, 3, q, e)-f(k+  1,3, q, ?) 
= EJX[t'=  o (I  -  a  )q'3'(1 + g)I(o 1  (t, m) c-  t, k, as) f-) D(t, w) rn  E(t,  o)) I  (A3) 
where  a realization  of co now includes  also the set of players  who "tremble"  and play D accidentally  in each 
period  and E(t, co) is defined  to be the set of players  affected  by an s-probability  tremble  up to and including 
time t. If T(t,  a)  is the set of players  who tremble  at time t for a realization  of  o, E(t, co) can be formally 
defined  by 
E(O,  a))= T(O,  ao) 
E(t+  1, co)  =E(t,  co) u  T(t+  1, co) u {iioi(t,  co)eE(t,  o)}. 
Using the expansions  (3) and (A3) we get 
q(3)  ((f(k,  3, q'(3 ), 0)-f(k  + 1, 3, q'(6 ), 0))-(f(k,  6, q'(6  ),  E)-f(k+  1, 3,  q'(3),  ))) 
1-35 
=EJ  , oqs()t+(1  at+  g.(o+g)I,(oE(t,  o))e C(t,Ak,4o))D(t,o))r  E(t,o))I 
;S  E.[?t  6t+ '(I +g)I(ol(t,  a))eE(t,o@))7].  (A4) 586  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 
Given il > 0 as defined  above, we can choose T such that 
3,T T 
1 -6'  4(1 +g) 
Next, choose E sufficiently  small  such that 
Prob  {E(T, a))  0} <  +  * 
Now, for any 3 E [6', 1) and any E  < E the right-hand  side of equation  (A4) is bounded  above  by q/2. This  and 
equations  (7) and (8) gives 
lq (l(  f (l, 6, q (6 ),  E-f  (2, 6, q (6 ),E)) > g + 11/2 
and 
(ff(2, 6, q (6 ),  E-f  (3, 6, q (6 ),E)) < g -  i/2. 
The first  equation  is (9). Using the expansion  (A3) in place  of (3) it is easy to see that the result  of Lemma  I 
carries  over to the model  with E-noise.  This and the second  equation  above  gives  us (10). 
Now that (9) and (10) have  been  established,  I will proceed  to show  that there  are  no profitable  deviations 
from  either  phase  I or phase  II play in the s-constrained  game.  The phase  II case is easier  so I'll start  with  that. 
Note that we can rewrite  (10) to give Ve  < El, a E  [6', 1), and k > 2, 
3q'(3)(f(k,  6, q'(a),  s)-f(k+  1, 6, q'(a),  e))<(I  -6)g. 
As in the proof of Proposition  1, the right hand side of this expression  is the short term loss when a player 
plays C instead  of D in phase  II and is matched  with someone  who plays C. The expectation  over  k of the left- 
hand side is the expected  future  gain.  Clearly,  the future  gain is too small  to make  a deviation  profitable. 
The discussion  of phase I play is more complicated  than before  because  a player  in phase I must assign 
probability  rk>O  to the event  that unbeknown  to him, k other  players  are already  playing  according  to phase 
II or will tremble  and play D in the current  period.  Keep in mind that rk is a function  both of s and of the 
history  of the game.  I will show,  however,  that for s sufficiently  small  this uncertainty  is small  regardless  of the 
history  of the game. 
To show that player 1's best response  whenever  he is in phase  I in period  t is to play C, I will not show 
directly  that his expected  payoff  from  playing  C in period  t and then  following  his equilibrium  strategy  is better 
than his expected  payoff from playing  D in period t then following  his equilibrium  strategy.  Instead,  I will 
compare  the payoff  from  playing  C in period  t then  switching  to phase  II play  in period  t + I to the payoff  from 
playing  D in period  t and continuing  according  to phase  II. Player  1's  period  t action  has no affect  on play  after 
any period  t +s in which  q,  +>  q'(3). We have  already  seen  that  playing  D in phase  II is a best repsonse  so that 
the latter  strategy  gives  the greatest  possible  expected  payoff  to a player  who plays  D in period  t. If the former 
is greater,  the best response  must  involve  playing  C in period  t. 
To compare  the payoffs  of the two strategies,  look first  at the period-t  outcome.  If player I plays D in 
period  t he gains  g whenever  o (t) plays C and avoids  a loss of I whenever  o (t) plays  D. Hence  the short  term 
gain is 
M-l  {m-k-  I  k  1  z=0rk(M  1g+-k  ) 
Y?k=o  V  M_  I  M  -IJ 
In the future,  a player  who plays  D in period  t can never  be better  off because  both strategies  prescribe  the same 
play from period  t + I on and there  are always  either  the same  number  or more players  in phase II in period 
t + 1. When  k= 0 and there  are also no s-probability  trembles  in period  t + 1, the player  who plays  D in period 
t is worse off, obtaining  a continuation  payoff of f(2,  6, q'(6  ), s)  instead  of f(l,  6, q'(6  ), s).  The discounted 
expected  loss is then at least 
ro(1  -  X)M  -q'()  (f(l,  3, q'(6)),  s)-f(2,  6, q'(6),  E)). 
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To show  that playing  C is better  in period  t is thus suffices  to show  that this loss outweighs  the short-term  gain. 
Using (9), it will suffice  to show 
ro(I -  s)M-(g+  q/2)>rog+(I  -ro)  max (g, 1). 
We can choose E2 such  that 
(I-  )M'-(g + i/2)  >g+  i/4 
for all E  < E2  . It then only remains  to establish 
r  owi/4  >(I - ro0)  max  (g, 1)  (A5) 
for E sufficiently  small. 
At first  look one might  think  that if the game  has been going on long enough  then player  I will be fairly 
sure that someone  must have trembled.  This reasoning  suggests  that the ro  term  might  not dominate  in (A5). 
However,  it is important  to keep  in mind  that ro  is not an unconditional  probability,  but rather  the conditional 
probability  that no one has trembled  since the last time s that q.  >q'(6)  occurred  given that no opponent  of 
player I has played D since that time. Write  ro(t) for the probability  that all other players  are cooperating 
conditional  on it having  been t periods  since q5>q'(6) and on cooperation  only having  been observed  in that 
time. To show in fact that 
lim inf ro(t) = I  (A6) 
-0 IO 
take any 4  >0. We can choose T1 so that 
Prob {Player  I is still in phase  It  Some  player  was in phase  II T, periods  ago} < (1  -  )(  -/2) 
2 
Next choose E3 so that 
(I -E3)TM>  I-C/2 
We now show by induction  that for any E  <  E3 and any t we have  ro(t) > I - C. First,  for t < T1, the probability 
that there  has been no tremble  is at least I - C/2 and conditioning  on not seeing  a tremble  only increases  this 
probability.  Next, if for some T> T, we have  ro(t) > I -  C for all t < T, then I -  ro(T+ 1) is less than the sum of 
the probability  that some  player  was in phase  II in period  T+ I -  T, conditional  on player  I still being  in phase 
1, and the probability  that there  has been a tremble  in the last T1 periods.  The first  probability  by Bayes'  rule 
is less than 
(I -  ro(T+ I -  T1))(1  - 0)(1  -  C/2)/2 
(I -ro(T+  I -  T1))(1 - C)(1 -  T/2)/2+ro(T+  I-  T1)(1  -  C/2) 
< ((  - C(l - C/2)  C 
2(1 -  )(l - C/2)  2 
The second  term  is at most 4/2. Hence,  by induction  rO(t)  > I -  C for all t. Choosing  E smaller  than El, E2, and 
E3 we get the sufficient  condition  (A5) for no deviations  in phase  I. This concludes  the proof that s*(6, E) is a 
sequential  equilibrium  of the E-constrained  game. 
Finally,  the proof of 3, that we get efficiency  in the limit, is relatively  easy. Consider  the largest  possible 
effect  that a single  tremble  by player  j in t period  t can have  on player  i's total payoff  anywhere  on the path of 
the equilibrium  with noise. This tremble  can only affect  player  i's payoff  in period  t and in any future  priod 
until  the first  time q,  +<  q'(6).  Thus,  the expected  loss caused  by this single  tremble  is at most 
a'  E_  (I -  6 )6sq'(  )s(1 +g+  l)=  (  1+g+l) 
Player  i's expected  per  period  payoff  is equal  to I minus  the expected  loss from  each  possible  tremble  times  the 
probability  of that tremble  occurring.  This gives 
f(O, a, q'(),  E)  >  I?-(I-  )f,  0 (I + g +l)  ME 
1  (I +g+l)Ms 
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Clearly 
lim lim  f(0, 3, q'(8),  ?) = 1.  1I 
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